


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
I can say to you with great confidence that I doubt that anywhere else in the business world or in government will you find more dedicated, more capable public servants than in the Central Intelligence Agency and the other associated intelligence organizations in our country. They have an admirable record, and with this I am confident we have the foundation on which to rebuild public confidence which is much deserved.

Stansfield Turner



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A quarterly publication for the exchange among DDA personnel of ideas, concepts, information, and techniques that are of common interest.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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
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# staff

SENIOR EDITORS



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# comment

In October 1977, the Directorate of Intelligence and the National Intelligence Officers were merged. The new organization that was formed is called the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). As Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence, I became responsible for organizing a production program for national intelligence (National Intelligence Estimates and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda). I also became the Director of CIA's NFAC. The main reason for this merger was to increase efficiency in the production of finished intelligence by consolidating in one unit all of the Director's analytical resources. Organizational realignments and changes in personnel were kept to a minimum in effecting the merger.

The Center will continue to support the production of national intelligence, to produce the President's Daily Brief, the daily and weekly current intelligence publications, and the memos, briefings, and research studies that respond to policymaker needs. The merger facilitates the allocation of

resources to the highest priority topics in any category of production. The NFAC Production Board is the clearinghouse for major decisions about priorities.

Another aim of the merger is to increase the amount of interdisciplinary production that takes place. When NIOs and Office Directors meet in the Production Board to share their ideas about requirements for finished intelligence, it often becomes clear that several offices are working independently on pieces of a common problem. It is now possible to see to it that their activities are coordinated as to objectives and timing. Sometimes special multi-office production teams are pulled together to ensure the optimum level of integration of effort. Over time, we expect this to contribute to an improvement in the quality of our analyses. Policymakers will be better served by a treatment of issues that more accurately reflects the complex interplay of social, political, economic, military, and technological forces in international relations.

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Dr. Robert R. Bowie  
Director, National Foreign  
Assessment Center

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A major concern is to ensure that the subjects of our intelligence production are as relevant and useful to the policymaker as we can make them. Over the past several months we have worked with the National Security Council's Policy Review Committee (Intelligence) to formulate a very specific list of the most important areas in which policymakers need intelligence support. We are comparing our proposed production to that list in order to make certain that each of the areas is given proper attention. Because of this two-way communication about requirements and objectives, NFAC has an excellent opportunity to provide intelligence analyses that will be used in the policy formation process.

At the formation of NFAC there was some concern on the part of our employees and their friends throughout the Agency that CIA had lost its intelligence production arm. Some people wondered whether they still worked for CIA, or for some other unidentified entity. NFAC remains a part of CIA and our employees are CIA employees.

This being the case, it hardly needs saying that we will continue to need the support of the DDA. Our main contact is with your colleagues who are assigned directly to NFAC for support in personnel, finance, and general administration. We could not depend more on these people. We are also acutely aware of our daily dependence on the Offices of Communications, Security, Training, Logistics, Data Processing, and Medical Services. In particular, we depend on Communications for our daily reporting from the field, on Logistics for the negotiation of our many external research contracts and for the allocation and renovation of our space in Headquarters (a never ending task). With Training's help, we have just completed the first running of a seminar for established analysts. It is designed to make analysts aware of bias in their work and to give them experience in problem solving in a multidisciplinary team. Data Processing supports our analysts heavily by providing an incredible number of computer services that allow us to analyze more data and to understand better the relationships between events.

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Security makes our daily work easier by offering advice on problems of classification, compartmentation, and clearance. NFAC personnel rely heavily on Medical Services for examinations, treatment of illness and injuries at work, counseling services, and support for foreign travel. In short, the professional performance of you in DDA makes it possible for us to do our job more effectively by minimizing the time we must spend on administrative duties.

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ters computers. The next problem addressed was to identify, on a priority basis, those applications which would lend themselves to such treatment, including logistics, finance, etc. Current testing of electrically transmitting T&A's in this fashion was reported on. The bottom line is to develop a system to send data back through Agency communications facilities directly into a Headquarters data base, have that data base take some action, and keep the field apprised of the status of actions taken. Everything that is being developed in this regard is a part of the Clandestine Records Application Field Terminal (CRAFT) Project.

The next session that evening dealt with the possibility of combining support staffs across division lines; placing the personnel sections in divisions under PEMS; splitting the budget units out of the B&F sections and placing them under the divisions' Plans and Programs Staffs; and, centralizing finance and logistics functions. The underlying ques-

tion, invariably, was would we gain or lose efficiency in using our limited resources.

In the morning session on 7 March, the subject was the possible restructuring of administrative work. This brought the discussion back to previous considerations of the role of operations support assistants, reopening the MG Career Service, Regional Support Center concepts, and ADP applications.

In the afternoon session on 7 March, there was a wrap-up presentation on the conference. Mr. Malanick felt that the conferees had identified several issues which merited further research and study. The Regional Support Center concept was selected as a topic well worth pursuing. Four Support Chiefs were assigned to study it and prepare a working paper. Another issue that merited further study was the role, management, and training of operations support assistants. Three officers were assigned that task and

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have been asked to prepare a position paper. A third topic selected for further study was the Support Officer of the Future and the desirability of reopening of the MG Career Service. Three officers were assigned to this study group.

In addition to the three working groups, a series of recommendations were made by the conferees on how to improve communications within DDA and between the DDA and the DDO. As of this writing, a separate response to the DDO on these items is being prepared and will be sent to him.

Those who attended the conference felt it was highly successful and recommended that another one be held several months from now.

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# forum

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## data processing

### TRACKING OUR FOES

 ODP

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(S) Somewhere within a denied territory another test vehicle is launched. And once again the United States attempts to determine the significance of this test by recording the event and analyzing the data. One of the keys to this determination is the intercepted telemetry from this event. With hundreds of similar tests occurring yearly, keeping up with the volume of telemetry and tracking data has become an increasingly difficult task.

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(S) Within the Agency, OWI and OSO are responsible for analyzing intercepted telemetry signals, and for establishing various elements of measurement recorded within the telemetry signals. These elements are restructured in time dependent steps, and the results are compared with known vehicles to determine if this is a test of a previously identified vehicle. If so, the analysis may provide additional data on some of the vehicle's characteristics. If not, this may be the first recorded and analyzed test of a new or modified vehicle.

(U) The current analysis technique includes the submission of computer runs against the telemetry and tracking data to the ODP Ruffing Computer Center. While this practice has kept up with the most critical requirements, it does have some substantial drawbacks, perhaps the most important being the inability to make rapid, accurate measurements from the data. An analyst working with the computer output has two undesirable alternatives: he may try to make measurements from a hard copy plot, thereby

sacrificing accuracy; or he may try to correlate a plot of the data with a computer listing of the same data. The latter method is so time consuming that an analyst rarely uses it.

(AIUO) The Telemetry Analysis Display System (TADS) was designed to eliminate these drawbacks. TADS would provide a dedicated computer-based interactive system consisting of an online data base of time series data and analysis results files. Initial TADS concepts were developed in 1972, and, after competitive bidding, [REDACTED] Incorporated was selected as the development firm in 1976. Coding, integration, and testing are underway, with system acceptance tests scheduled for August 1978.

(U) The TADS hardware configuration is a host computer (currently the IBM 360-67 formerly used to support the ODP CP-CMS time sharing service) supporting up to eight remote graphics work stations, three electrostatic plotters, and eight alphanumeric terminals.

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as a new type of RV, additional data would be loaded, and more elaborate analysis would be performed to determine the significance of the change.

(AIUO) ODP's objective is to have the TADS system operational with eight Graphic Work Stations, eight Alphanumeric Stations, and three Plotters by the Fall of 1978. This configuration will be sufficient to handle high priority work and special analysis that cannot be done in a standard computer environment, and provide a TADS analysis capability for [REDACTED] and the majority of the OWI analysts.

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## information

THREE YEARS LATER

or

"Caught in the Act"

[REDACTED] IPS

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Two years ago we reported on the Freedom of Information Act and some of its effects on the Agency. At that time we felt that we could live with the Act, despite its inconveniences. True, we had a backlog of 2,400 unanswered requests, but we were confident that we could get up off the canvas, wrestle the backlog down to reasonable size, and perhaps claim a modest victory.

For a while, in 1976, it looked as if we might do it. We worked out procedures to speed up processing, developed a computerized log to keep track of our cases, coerced Records Center into handling the

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overflow from our file room (about 350 files a month), and even reduced the backlog to 1,000.

That was in July.


By fall, the American public had taken a deep breath and come charging in again. The MKULTRA drug documents had been publicized by the media, and everyone who felt that he might have been an unwitting CIA guinea pig was writing to demand satisfaction. (That was when our requests jumped to more than 500 a month.) The American Civil Liberties Union renewed its charges that we tampered with U.S. mail, and a fresh flood of requests—many from people who had already been assured that we didn't monitor their letters—came pouring in. Special groups, such as the American Labor Party, wrote to us en bloc. In short, business in 1977 was up 38% over 1976. Do what we would, the backlog of unanswered requests simply went on growing. We had hoped to reduce it permanently to less than a thousand. By Christmas it had passed our old peak and was heading for the 3,000 mark.

Aside from the fact that the public can write requests faster than we can write answers, why are we falling behind?

For one thing, the 1977 requester is tougher and better informed than the 1975 version. Two years ago we could take care of three out of four requesters with a form letter saying in effect, "Sorry—never heard of you." We can answer less than half that way today. The rest know what they want, and they want lots of it. College editors, spurred by the Center for National Security Studies, write to us for details of our relations, past and present, with their campus. Their professors, who have found the Freedom of Information Act to be a gold mine, write to us for information on everything from OSS to Watergate. The relatives of servicemen listed as Missing in Action write to us by the hundred and will not take No Record for an answer. And some, impatient because we cannot answer within the time limits required by law, are either exercising their right of appeal or taking us to court.

If a regular search takes time and manpower—and the average request takes

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3 to 6 months—an appeal is even worse. The case must be taken out of our regular channels, legal talent must be assigned from the Office of General Counsel (OGC), and the entire review must be done over. Appeals take from 9 months to a year to process, and the amount of paper that they can generate is appalling. There are more than 260 appeals lined up at the moment, and the line is slowly growing. Court cases are slower and more expensive still. We have not lost any significant cases so far, but we can't help remembering the saying, "You can't win 'em all."

Another problem is that CIA files were never intended to work in this way. At least part of our security has always depended on having decentralized files, and in maintaining The Need To Know. This is fine—for security; but it also means that we must send the average request to 13 different places, simply to be sure that we are doing a legitimate search. Many operational documents will be reviewed as many as nine different times, to make sure that nothing is

released which should not be. When all the material has been pulled together and put in proper form, the final decision to release must still be made by some overburdened official in top management. Small wonder that the average request, that the law says must be answered within 10 days, takes more than 3 months to process. Some of the big ones, like the one which asked for all information on Che Guevara and some of his colleagues, take considerably longer.

We have had very few flaps resulting from some piece of information that has slipped out inadvertently. (The kind of uproar that followed the release of the drug documents was not a flap. We had no choice but to release them, and were more or less braced for the consequences.) Our record is partly due to the hard work of over a hundred dedicated reviewers, and partly due to our policy of giving a final check to anything that looks as if it might be trouble. This is done by a panel of representatives from IPS, the Public Affairs Office, and OGC. It is inevitable, when we are dealing with 4,000 cases a

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year, that something will get past. But we can only keep looking, trying on the one side to fulfill our obligations to the public, and on the other to maintain the security essential to operating an intelligence service. On the wall, as you come in the main entrance to Headquarters, is the noble quotation from John, "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Upstairs, over our door, is the quotation from Jonah, XXIX, 1: And Jonah said unto the whale, "Had you kept your big mouth shut, this would never have happened."

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## logistics

### NEW PRINTING TECHNOLOGY FOR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

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Until recently, the typical printing facility functioned with equipment and techniques capable of producing high quality products but which required scarce skills and long processing times.

Long job throughput and labor intensive-ness are essentially what prompted P&PD to automate its typesetting facilities via the Electronic Text Editing and Composition System (ETECS). ETECS' effectiveness and success in handling both the publisher's and the printer's typographic composition concerns have been remarkable. Since January 1976, when ETECS became operational, it has grown from a single computer four-terminal adjunct to "conventional" typesetting, into a dual processor sixteen-terminal

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system through which virtually every Agency published typeset page is produced.

More significant than ETECS' growth is the increase in typesetting that it has made possible. Prior to ETECS only about 2,000 pages per month benefitted from the improved esthetics and readability and data compaction that typesetting allows. Since ETECS this figure has more than doubled, and is expected to more than double again by 1980. A significant portion of this increased production will result from connecting the ODP computer center to ETECS via a communication line. In essence, this will provide anyone with access to an ODP video display terminal with the capability to send suitable computer files to ETECS and P&PD for printing. Up to this point, when printing of these files was required, EPIC, an antiquated and slow batch processing program, was utilized, or the job was totally re-keyboarded in P&PD, using the venerable Linotype machine. In order to accommodate this increase in production, P&PD will shortly procure a third ETECS computer, six additional video display terminals, and associ-

ated data storage and output peripherals. Space limitations in the Headquarters Building, where the present dual system is located, will make it necessary to install the third ETECS module in the P&PD Building, which is adjacent to the West Parking Lot.

In order to be fully effective, the Headquarters and P&PD Building systems must be capable of passing data between each other. This communications requirement will be satisfied by the installation of an infrared data communications link connecting the two buildings. The link is expected to be operational by this April in anticipation of an early summer third ETECS installation. In addition to supporting ETECS, this link will also have the capacity to allow transmission of the bulk of the Computer Output Microfilm (COM) data that currently requires manual transportation between the Headquarters computer center and the COM recorders located in the P&PD Photography Branch.

It should be understood that, even with all of its power, ETECS only automates composition, the first of the six production proc-

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esses required to produce printed products. ETECS does nothing to facilitate offset photography, layout, platemaking, press, or bindery. In actuality, because of its effectiveness, ETECS has increased the pressure on the production activities downstream from it to the point that their automation will soon become necessary to keep up with the flood of work.

In this connection, P&PD has been following the development of the laser platemaker, a device that is likely to deal effectively with current and expected production backlogs associated with offset photography, layout, and platemaking. Up to now the most advanced way of producing offset printing plates has been by a photographic method. The text and graphics comprising a publication are photographed, and the resulting negatives are tediously laid out on a mask which in turn is placed in contact with a metal plate that has a photosensitive coating. Then, by exposing the negative to a light source, the image is transferred to the plate which is chemically developed. With a laser system the text and graphics are assembled

in positive form, a much faster process than laying out negatives as in the photographic method. The assembled text and graphics are scanned by a laser beam that reflects light to a photomultiplier tube that changes the light to electrical impulses. These are transmitted to a second laser beam that exposes the photosensitive metal plate to form an image. The plate is then developed. The laser system eliminates the photographic step, and significantly reduces layout and platemaking time. Even greater time savings have been demonstrated by "feeding" the laser platemaker text and graphics in digital form from a system such as ETECS. This arrangement totally eliminates the production and handling of positives or negatives, and allows printing plates to be made directly from a computer, thereby minimizing manual operation. P&PD has included the procurement of a laser platemaking system in its fiscal year 1980 program call.

Also included in P&PD's 1980 program call is the procurement of a web (continuous roll of paper) fed press. Properly equipped with in-line bindery equipment this press, be-

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cause of its great potential speed, will reduce the time involved in actually printing and binding certain jobs to as little as half the time it now takes.

Hopefully, by the close of 1980, P&PD will have succeeded in applying state-of-the-art technology to the major activities involved in producing printed products. Also available by then will be non-silver photographic products, and typesetting systems that handle entire pages, including graphics, with the same facility that present day machines process single lines. Electronic scanners for separating colors for printing, and electronic analyzers for previewing the results of scanning will be commonplace. Presses will be equipped with computerized control technology, and the realtime transmission of various kinds of imagery, in reproducible form via satellite, will be available. The application of the technology outlined here will enable P&PD to produce more of the Agency's product more rapidly and with improved quality, thereby contributing to a more meaningful intelligence effort.

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## personnel

WHY DOES IT ALL TAKE SO LONG?

OP

How many times a day do we get asked that question? Applicants and employing components alike want to know the answer. There is no easy answer. The recruitment, processing, and EODing of potential employees involves the coordinated efforts of four of the offices of the DDA—OP, OS, OMS, and OTR. The review and decisionmaking process reaches out into each of the Directorates. It takes the Agency an average of six months from receipt of application in Staff Personnel Division (SPD) until EOD. Hard as it may be to believe, this compares favorably with the rest of the federal government, even though most other agencies do not require an exhaustive background investigation and an intensive medical evaluation.

The process begins when an Office levies a requirement on SPD. It proceeds through the

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review of incoming applicants and it reaches out to the regional offices of the Recruitment Division. An application can be a letter, a resume, or full forms (Personal History Statement) and, depending upon what it consists of, determines the length of time required for the initial review, interview, and decision to crank up the security and medical processing. Because of the amount of time and effort involved in completing the 17-page Personal History Statement (PHS) and the limited and very specific needs of the Agency, we encourage the use of completed resumes for this exploratory review.

The majority of the professional and technical applications received are listed on the New Applicant File Acquisition sheet which is disseminated to all component personnel officers. Through a rather complex, but thorough system, the applicant's file is routed to each office that could have an interest in the background, experience, or languages offered. If there is interest generated, then a preprocessing interview and any additional testing required is arranged after a name check of security records has been

made. If the applicant is from out of town, his transportation and actual subsistence (NTE \$35 per day) is paid by OP. Assuming we have a happy marriage, the Office will request SPD to initiate the processing for EODing.

In order to initiate this EOD processing, SPD will need a completed current PHS packet. The PHS's are reproduced in the number of copies required by OS and, along with the Authorization to Release Information and Form 377 (Request for Security Clearance), are forwarded to the Clearance Division, OS. The Medical Report is submitted with Form 259 (Request for Medical Evaluation) to OMS. For the next week to ten days the file will lie dormant while we await Security and Medical preliminary review of the papers and notification of invitee clearances. This type of clearance merely says there are no preliminary problems and the security field investigation will begin.

The applicant is then called, advised that the processing has been initiated, and medical and polygraph appointments are



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set. This is followed by a letter confirming the initiation, the grade and salary, and attaching a copy of the appointment schedule.

When the field investigation has been completed and the polygraph report received, OS will evaluate the case and, assuming there are no problems, will advise OP of a clearance to EOD. The medical clearance can be given within a few days following the applicant's physical examination.

Upon receipt of these clearances, OP will recontact the buying component for assurance that the position is still available and that they are ready to receive the applicant as soon as a mutual EOD date can be set.

It is desired that the applicant EOD on a Monday and regularly scheduled new EOD orientation classes are held every week at the Ames Building with the professional and technical EOD's alternating Mondays with the clerical EOD's. The new employee is given the Oath of Office, followed by brief-

ings on Agency organizations, benefits, and administrative practices. In the afternoon they are briefed by members of Military Personnel Branch, Credit Union, Insurance Branch, and Employee Activities Association. On Tuesday morning they report to the Badge Office for badging and briefings and are then sent to their respective offices.

Voilà! CIA has a new employee.

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## communications

THE FIELD COMMUNICATOR—A MOST VALUABLE RESOURCE

 OC

Many words have been written about CIA communicators and the various jobs they perform in the field. Some call them a necessary evil while others believe that communicators are the greatest thing since Corn Flakes. It probably all depends on individual experiences. If the communicator was the guy who constantly got you out of bed at 2:00 a.m. to read an immediate cable, he would be the bad guy. (Remember, he got up before you, processed this message and then waited around for you to come in.) However, if he copied the message that announced your most recent promotion, or the one that reassigned you to some plush post, then he of course would be the good guy again. It's all relative!

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A recent example of the kind of "can do" attitude our communicators have adopted, and a good reason why they are held in such

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## medical services

### MORE ABOUT ASSESSMENT CENTERS

██████████ Ph.D., OMS

In the October issue of *DDA Exchange*, reference was made to Assessment Centers and Assessment Center methodology in two separate articles. One article described the use of the Assessment Center technique as one specifically designed to study an individual's potential for responding to the demands of managerial positions, while the other described the technique as one designed to study an individual's potential for responding to the demands of Project AIM positions, none of which directly involved managerial responsibilities. This article may help to clarify for some readers these seemingly contradictory descriptions of Assessment Center methodology.

The germinal notion of the Center, pioneered by the Assessment Staff of OSS (the

progenitor of today's Psychological Services Staff-OMS) placed the primary emphasis upon the design of simulations of real-life tasks... simulations reflecting the key aspects of performance situations that OSS candidates might eventually be required to handle in the field. Through observation of candidates as they faced these simulations, Assessors-Observers attempted to generate dynamic descriptions of the candidates in an effort to support accurate prediction of "most likely" individual behaviors in future real-life performance situations. Very early in the development of Center methodology, it became clear that unless there actually are observable behaviors rather consistently associated with both successful as well as unsuccessful performance in real-life situations, then design of a Center is an impossible task. Granted valid behavioral criteria of success vs. failure performance (typically defined by means of consensus among "experts" regarding the performance studied), the Center methodology can be extended to practically any area of performance-work.

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Currently, Centers are being used to evaluate: potential for performance in sales, in technical areas and in entrepreneurial activities; the progress of AB degree candidates (including the award of bona fide undergraduate credits for successful performance in the Center); the qualifications of applicants for licensure as Psychologist; the potential of uniformed police for advancement to the position of Detective . . . and so the list goes. Recently, the American Psychological Association has funded a feasibility study to explore the utility of Centers in evaluating Psychologists for award of nationally accepted certification of excellence (the so-called Diplomate) across 4-5 professional specialties.

The validity of Centers is a matter no longer open to critical debate. The utility of Centers (the overall cost effectiveness) is, however, a matter which must be carefully considered by potential consumers. Unfortunately, most consumers seldom possess data adequate to the task of evaluating Center utilities. While a small number of

consumers do have information regarding the dollars and cents cost of operating their standard evaluation-selection systems, almost none are able to cite data regarding: the predictive validity of their present systems (how accurately they can predict most likely future real-life performance); the cost to the consumer of making a "bad" selection decision; the value to the consumer of making a "good" decision; and, most importantly, adequate and pragmatic definitions of "bad" and "good" decisions, i.e., "success" and "failure" in the real-life situation.

While the question of Center utility is problematic, this much is clear . . . Centers enjoy their greatest utility when they are used as a complement to the consumers extant selection mechanisms. The most effective Centers are those designed to measure solely those elements of performance potential which are not addressed-measured by the consumer's present evaluation-selection system. Comments in the article in the October issue about using the Center to replace a system which

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competitively evaluates and ranks over 1,000 employees annually contain erroneous implications. The classic example of combining a Center with other data sources has been described in the article in the October issue concerning Project AIM. In the Project AIM program, candidates are admitted to the Center on the basis of a twofold screening, viz., performance record and psychometric data. Again, the Center has to be regarded as a complement to rather than a replacement for established evaluation-selection systems.

Finally, while there has been considerable focus upon Centers in terms of their use in evaluation-selection, other areas of critical impact remain to be commented upon. No Center does or should operate without affording participants the opportunity for feedback on their Center performance as well as upon its implications for career futures. (All Agency Centers to date have provided opportunity for feedback.) Unfortunately at present, data are sparse regarding the impact of feedback on Center participa-

tion to employees as this relates to their personal career planning efforts. The small amount of anecdotal information available within the Agency has been largely positive. The second area of critical impact is that of subsequent on-the-job performance of employees trained to serve as Assessors-Observers in Centers. Again, the information available (largely from A.T. & T. experiences) is primarily anecdotal and positive.

While the foregoing has been brief and limited to areas of possible misunderstandings regarding Assessment Centers, it is hoped that a more detailed and expansive article on Centers may be presented in the near future for the perusal of Agency management.

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## finance

CENTRAL TRAVEL BRANCH (CTB)—FOR  
THE TRAVELER'S BENEFIT

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(U) CTB is sometimes mistaken for Central Processing Branch, OP. The confusion is understandable. Both are involved with travel in one form or another. A good rule of thumb to distinguish between the two is that Central Processing Branch plans and coordinates PCS and TDY travel prior to its commencement; Central Travel Branch is responsible for helping the traveler account after completion of the journey.

(U) Central Processing Branch assists travelers in arranging itineraries, accommodations, acquiring travel documentation, tickets and funds as well as in arranging for the shipment of POV's and household effects—a small task. Central Travel Branch,

upon completion of travel, assists the traveler with his or her accounting, and also pays the many billings received by the Agency for shipment and storage of effects by commercial firms or other Government agencies.

(U) Central Travel Branch has an equal responsibility to the Agency and to the traveler to keep in step with travel policy changes as they affect Government travel in general and the Agency in particular. Ours is a service organization with an eye to helping the traveler prepare a claim within the guidelines of the many laws and regulations presently in existence. It's difficult at best to keep up with the constantly changing decrees and edicts governing the field of travel. In this connection, Central Travel Branch is continually researching and seeking clarification of the many rules and regulations concerning travel that filter through the Branch daily.

(U) The traveler is expected to be prudent in his arrangements—not always an easy accomplishment. For example, the traveler

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might think it reasonable to use a domestic travel agency for ease in securing transportation and accommodations, but the law and regulations strictly forbid this action. Should the traveler be unaware of or ignore this regulation, it could result in administrative actions against the traveler when accounting for the trip.

(U) Failure to know and comply with the travel regulations may result in monetary penalties to the traveler as well. When speaking of monetary penalties, another regulation comes to mind—the "Fly America" Act. The Government is unrelenting in its quest to have Government employees use American airlines in all cases where possible, and will require the traveler to bear a part of the travel expense if these rules are violated. And one last point bears mentioning—First Class air travel regulations and procedures have recently been changed to reflect new, very stringent guidelines for the use of First Class air. Failure to conform to these guidelines may also result in monetary penalties to the traveler.

(U) These rules and regulations may seem harsh at first glance and, given their complexity, may leave the traveler in the dark wondering which way to turn. Clarification and assistance are available in Central Processing Branch which acts as a travel agency, and in making travel arrangements insures the optimum usage of American airlines; and from Central Travel Branch. An informed traveler aware of his entitlements and the regulations prior to travel is less likely to encounter possible problems accounting in Central Travel Branch when the journey has been completed.

(U/AIUO) In almost every case Central Travel Branch is able to help the traveler. We have the experience, skill, and capability to perform the necessary functions related to accounting for all types of travel. Please feel free to call on us on extension [REDACTED] or to visit us at 5-B-2826 Headquarters. We are at your disposal.

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## security

### RESIDENTIAL SECURITY

OS

Since the death of Mr. Richard Welch, Chief of Station, Athens, in December 1975, OS has been vigorously pursuing a Personnel Protection Program. The Program is designed to protect employees and their families from terrorist and criminal acts that might be aimed against them during their off-duty hours. A big aspect of the Program involves providing advice and guidance on residential security. Recently, the OS Senior Editor requested that an article on this subject be written for publication in DDA Exchange, but from the standpoint of living right here in the United States. This article is offered in response to that request.

Depending upon whose statistics you accept, there are 2.5 or 3 million burglaries each year; one every 10 seconds or one

every 15 seconds; and either \$400 million or over \$500 million in goods stolen each year. The accuracy of these statistics is largely irrelevant, since their value lies only in highlighting the very real fact that burglary is a major crime problem in the United States and one which many of us stand a good chance of encountering at some point in our lifetimes.

Almost everyone either has been the target of a burglary or is acquainted with someone who has been the object of such a criminal act. For example, within the past year, the author's elderly mother was held at gunpoint by three obviously professional thieves while they looted the home where she was babysitting.

Despite experiences of this nature, there is a normal human tendency on the part of most of us to believe that this sort of thing happens to other people and "can't happen here." Until each of us overcomes this mindset and recognizes that we, indeed, can become the target of the burglar, we will not

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undertake the most elementary precautions to provide for the protection of our homes, our possessions and our families.

The individual should approach the protection of his residence in a systematic fashion, developing an integrated program which contains the various elements which go to make up a completed security system, such as perimeter barriers, lighting, locks, alarms, safehavens and the procedural measures which tie those physical defenses together and make them work. The first step in constructing such a program ought to be a security survey of the residence. This should be accomplished by assessing the defenses of the residence through the eyes of the potential intruder. If you were the burglar, how would you attack your home? Once the vulnerabilities in the defensive posture have been assessed, then you can begin to develop a realistic residential security program.

The primary objective of any burglar is to steal your most valuable possessions and

escape with them undetected. The last thing he wants is a confrontation with you, the householder. That is why, contrary to popular belief, a large portion of residential break-ins occurs during daylight hours—the period from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.—when homes are most likely to be unoccupied. The hours between 6 p.m. and midnight are the second most popular times for the burglar to strike, since this is the period in which most people do their socializing.

Many homes become a target of opportunity because the householder makes himself an inviting target. Thieves will often cruise through neighborhoods looking for tell-tale signs of an unoccupied home in order to line up an easy mark. For this reason, the image or profile which your home projects to the outside world could mean the difference in whether or not you become a target for the burglar. To reduce the chances of being picked as a target in the first place, the householder should refrain from advertising this home as a good place to burglarize by implementing those simple procedural steps

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which cause a residence to appear to be occupied, or at least make it less obvious that it is unoccupied. These procedures include all the common sense "do's and don't's" which, for all their simplicity, remain valid—keep garage door closed, don't leave messages on door, stop deliveries when on vacation, put lights on and radio on timer, mix up shades and blinds, etc.

Despite these precautions, there is still the chance that your home will become the object upon which the burglar will attempt to ply his trade. You can never completely "burglar proof" your home. Given enough time and the right tools, a determined thief can get into practically any house. The objective of the physical portion of your residential security program should be to build a succession of barriers which make penetration sufficiently difficult and time consuming that the intruder is faced with an unacceptable risk of detection in his attempt to defeat the defenses. There are many easy targets for the burglar; there is no need for

him to run the risks involved in taking on a hard target.

Statistics again tell us that, for the most part, burglaries are not committed by professional criminals (although professional "rings or gangs" are certainly active), but in 85 percent of the cases by youthful amateurs under the age of 25. Consequently, in most instances you are not concerned with thwarting a sophisticated attack on your security hardware. Interestingly enough, it has been estimated that between 20 percent and 25 percent of all residential burglaries involved homes which had unlocked doors. So, regardless of the quality of the hardware you might install, it is no good to you unless you use it.

The production and retailing of security hardware and equipment has become a major industry in the United States over the past several years; witness the growth in the residential security hardware departments of such establishments as your local drug and

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hardware stores. There is a lot of good hardware on the market, and a lot of junk too. Although it is not always necessary to buy the highest priced item, generally "you get what you pay for." There is not the space in this article to engage in a long dissertation on the merits of the various locks and other security equipment which is available for the protection of the doors and windows of your homes. There are available numerous pamphlets, brochures and other publications which treat this subject with great detail. One of the most reliable sources of information on this subject is your local locksmith (and if you are not the "Harry Homeowner" type, he will, of course, be glad to install any equipment you might choose). The "Yellow Pages" of your telephone directory contain numerous listings.

The foregoing comments on security hardware apply equally to residential security alarms, another field which has seen phenomenal growth of late. There is a large variety of residential alarm systems on the

market today, although an evaluation of this product is much more difficult for the layman. A number of these systems are not only reliable and affordable, but can be installed relatively easily by the average homeowner.

In addition, a resource for assistance which should not be overlooked is your local police department. The community relations element of the police departments in the Washington, D. C. metropolitan area have crime prevention programs and are eager to assist the residents of their jurisdictions to increase the security of their residences. Some of the departments will present illustrated lectures to organizations; others will conduct security surveys of the individual residence upon request.

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## training

### COMMUNICATIONS SKILLS

#### Communications Skills Staff, OTR

"Excellence is our goal!" That is the slogan of the Chief of the Communications Skills Staff, a recently created element under the Deputy Director for Functional Training in OTR. A reorganization in January 1978 marked the consolidation of communications and administrative skills into the new component. The staff is responsible for the five administrative courses taught by OTR: Freedom of Information-Privacy Act Seminar, Employee Development for the Office Worker, Secretarial Administration, Office Management Seminar, and Administrative Procedures. The staff is also responsible for Writing Better Reports, Effective Written English, and Intelligence Briefing.

The Freedom of Information-Privacy Act Seminar is designed to familiarize Agency

Information and Privacy Officers and Coordinators with the FOI-PA laws and exemptions, and the procedures for processing requests. Employee Development for the Office Worker looks at the art of listening, patterns of communication, human relations, motivation, and office management. Secretarial Administration stresses the secretary's role as problem solver, supervisor, and manager of work flow. It offers each participant some techniques which improve secretarial performance by improving the secretary's knowledge of time management, problem solving, supervision, and patterns of communication. Office Management Seminar is designed to increase the effectiveness of the secretary as an office manager. It studies interpersonal communications, motivation, human relations, goal setting and self development, personal effectiveness, time management, the executive secretary as a part of the management team, and office management. It also provides an updating on the organization of the Agency and its relationship to the Intelligence Community. Administrative Procedures deals with secu-

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rity problems in overseas correspondence; dispatch, cable, and telepouch procedures; domestic travel; and operational terminology. A separate portion of the course covers DDO records.

Writing Better Reports focuses on five "universals" of writing tailored especially to Agency needs and applicable in all directorates of CIA. The course examines the special Agency uses of logic, development, definition, structure, and organization in writing. Effective Written English reviews the mechanics of English through a study of grammar and punctuation. The course touches on some basic writing principles such as outlining and paragraph development. Intelligence Briefing provides the basic skills to plan, organize, and present any type of briefing to any given audience. Emphasis is placed on oral communication, use of visuals in briefing, briefing outlines, and elimination of speaking defects.

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#### A VIGNETTE OF CIA HISTORY

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The following item appeared in the Federal Register, Volume 15, Number 35, Washington, Tuesday, February 21, 1950:

Executive Order 10111

Establishing a Seal for the Central Intelligence Agency

WHEREAS section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, approved June 20, 1949, (Public Law 110-81st Congress), provides, in part, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Central Intelligence Agency of such design as the President shall approve; and

WHEREAS the Director of Central Intelligence has caused to be made and has

recommended that I approve a seal of office for the Central Intelligence Agency the design of which accompanies and is hereby made a part of this order, and which is described in heraldic terms as follows:

SHIELD: Argent, a compass rose of sixteen points gules.

CREST: On a wreath argent and gules an American bald eagle's head erased proper.

Below the shield on a gold color scroll the inscription "United States of America" in red letters, and encircling the shield and crest at the top the inscription "Central Intelligence Agency" in white letters.

All on a circular blue background with a narrow gold edge:

AND WHEREAS it appears that such seal is of suitable design and is appropriate for establishment as the official seal of the Central Intelligence Agency:

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NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the said section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, I hereby approve such seal as the official seal of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Harry S. Truman  
The White House  
February 17, 1950

In July 1949, a notice was issued to civilian CIA employees which invited their suggestion for a suitable design to be used as the official seal of the Central Intelligence Agency as required by the June 1949 enactment of CIA legislation. Approximately a dozen sketches were received in response to the bulletin; however, none of them were acceptable. [REDACTED] Agency Management Office, the Agency official and coordinator for the design of a seal, contacted the U. S. Army Quartermaster Corps, Heraldic Division. During the next fifteen weeks, Mr. [REDACTED] and the Heraldic Division drafted about twenty seal designs. From this assortment, eight were prepared in color for presentation to the Director of Central Intelligence, Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter. The DCI selected the present seal and on February 17, 1950, President Harry S. Truman placed his signature of approval on Executive Order 10111.

The American Eagle on the seal is representative of our national bird and is a symbol

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of strength and alertness. The crest (the eagle's head on a wreath or "torse") was originally a figure affixed to the helmet of every commander, for distinction in the confusion of battle. The crest was laced or bolted on the helmet and the simplest way to hide the unsightly joint was a plain fillet of ribbon. The eagle is facing dexter, which is defined as the right hand side of the shield from the standpoint of the man behind the shield and in this position, the eagle signifies peace.

The torse is a twisted ribbon of two or more tinctures, which appears alternately in twists of six, of the principal metal and the principal color of the shield. The torse on the CIA seal is argent (silver) and gules (red). The first twist of the torse on the right side is of the metal.

The compass on the shield is a "charge" with radiating spokes signifying 16 compass points depicting the coverage of intelligence data from all areas of the world to a central

point. The colors red, white, and blue form the national colors.

The seal has been reproduced on CIA flags, letterhead, memoranda, award certificates, medals of honor, publications and is cast in terrazzo in the flooring at the Headquarters Building. For many years, the seal was not familiar to much of the world outside of CIA. In recent years, we have seen it published in newspapers and magazines worldwide. Most importantly, the seal signified to a small segment of American citizens a "company" where they have served. It signifies a family of professional federal workers who have had and still have a unique task to perform.

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# about dda

## INSURANCE BRANCH CLAIMS BACKLOG

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While much of the Nation has been busy digging out from under record snowfall, the Insurance Branch has been working overtime in an effort to dig its way out of the blizzard of Association Benefit Plan health insurance claim submissions which this season brings.

Historically, claim submissions increase toward the end of each year and into the early months of the following year. Many of the claims submitted during this period are "end of year" claims and include medical expenses incurred by one or more family members during the entire year. Many claims are submitted at year's end in hopes that settlement will be received in time to meet holiday expenses and others are submitted in connection with income tax preparation. From early November through the end of

February, the Insurance Branch is literally flooded by claims. This season an average of more than 850 claims per week has been received while we are processing an average of 770 claims per week. Weekly overlaps have snowballed into approximately 2400 pending claims or a seven week backlog of claims. This backlog is not unique to the Association Benefit Plan as presently most of the large Federal health benefits plans, including Blue Cross/Blue Shield, find themselves many weeks behind in claims processing.

There are however, other factors which contribute to this backlog. The increasing complexity of medical claims and billing procedures has slowed the settlement process. The Insurance Branch is also charged with the responsibility for administering eleven insurance plans offered to Agency employees by GEHA, Inc. These include, in addition to the ABP, Federal Employees Group Life Insurance, UBLIC, and WAEPA Life Insurance, Contract Health and Life

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insurance, Income Replacement, Dread Disease, Flight and Accident, Air Flight Trip insurance plans. Of the thirty-nine Insurance Branch employees, only eight full-time and two part-time claims adjustors process all the claims submitted for consideration under the Association Benefit Plan and Contract hospitalization. These claims totaled more than 25,000 and resulted in more than \$7 million in benefits for 1977. Our health benefits plan requires all health insurance claims be supported by a completed claim form with information on the nature of illness or injury for each item being claimed and include itemized bills. Insurance claims can be processed in minutes or they may require several hours depending on the number and complexity of bills involved. If all necessary supporting documentation is included with a claim, processing can be substantially reduced. Unfortunately, too many of the claims received by the Insurance Branch are incomplete and claims adjustors must spend additional time contacting the policyholder, doctors or hospitals, requesting the informa-

tion necessary to properly determine benefits payable.

As a service organization, the Insurance Branch is constantly working to improve the claims service. At the annual GEHA meeting on 31 January 1978, the Chief of Benefits and Services Division cited the reduction of the claims backlog from its present level to two-three weeks and the reduction of expensive overtime as major Insurance Branch goals. We are pursuing these goals in several ways. In 1977, the Insurance Branch circulated Employee Bulletin #592 containing detailed instructions for submitting claims. Specialized instructions were also provided to overseas Stations and Bases. In October 1977, a new claims screening system was set up to review all claims as they are received. Under this system incomplete claims are returned immediately to policyholders for additional information. In the past, due to a backlog of claims, these incomplete claims were not discovered until they were reviewed for settlement by a claims adjustor. By the

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time they were returned for additional information, several weeks had passed. Finally, during the coming weeks several new claims adjustor trainees will be added to the Insurance Branch staff.

The Insurance Branch is hopeful that these measures, in addition to the continued understanding and support of policyholders, will help us to reach our goal of providing timely claims settlement and assistance with your health insurance questions.

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#### LEAVE LEAP YEAR

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1978 is a unique year since there are 27 leave accrual periods. This situation arises only approximately once every eleven years. A leave year begins with the first day of the first complete pay period in a calendar year and ends with the day immediately before the first day of the first complete pay period in the following calendar year. Therefore, our leave year began on 1 January 1978 and ends 13 January 1979. Employees should be aware of the fact that they will earn an extra 4, 6, or 8 hours of leave based on the employee's rate of leave accrual. All employees are encouraged to keep the above information in mind when scheduling their annual leave for 1978.

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#### ETECS—A USER'S POINT OF VIEW

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ETECS was once an unwelcome word in the Regulations Control Branch (RCB). The Electronic Text Editing and Composition System, operated by the Printing and Photography Division (P&PD), is a system for computer storage of text, with easy accessibility for revision.

A year and a half ago RCB was in the market for such a system. Several possibilities were explored, with RCB favoring a stand-alone system accessible directly by branch members. ETECS was one of the possibilities explored since it had recently been put into operation in P&PD for other Agency publications. There were, however, a number of possible problems with ETECS. What about computer down-time? How often would RCB's work have to wait behind the priorities of other offices? In addition to these considerations, the system would re-

quire more work initially for the branch. In the beginning, we would have to input an entire regulation rather than just revised paragraphs, meaning much more proof-reading—both of computer-readable copy and of page proofs prepared from that copy. We would have little control over this system, as opposed to an RCB-operated system, since all input would have to be made by P&PD.

In the fall of 1976, the decision was made—ETECS was in. The people in management—people who wouldn't even be directly involved—had decided for the branch. For several weeks the complaints flowed constantly as office members grudgingly accepted the decision, prepared to inform the Plans Staffs of the DDA how to handle the submission of proposals, and started working out procedures.

The format of the machine readable text took some adjustment. We had to learn for ourselves as well as get across to all members of offices involved in originating

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proposals how to handle the intricacies of the format—how to set up paragraphs, how to handle non-machine readable characters, and how and when to use pen markings.

It wasn't long before we began discovering problems. We found out that some of our submissions had not been recorded in the computer. We went through the tedious exercise of finding out what was missing, resubmitting it, reproofing copy, and even re-reproofing in some cases. P&PD accommodated us and took responsibility for accuracy, but the problem was RCB's concern.

Another problem arose not long ago. The pacesetter, a typesetting machine, started omitting and transposing letters, words, and even paragraphs between the time the editors returned corrected page proofs and the computer rehandled the text for publishing. We initiated a considerable amount of reprinting to satisfy the originators. Dust specks in the machine were reported to be the cause. P&PD is no longer using the

pacesetter on regulations, but we began the procedure at that time of verifying page proofs after the final computer handling.

A year has passed now and ETECS is gaining our confidence. We currently have approximately 175 regulations stored in the system. ETECS works quickly (we usually see page proofs 2-3 days after submission and verify final proofs 1-2 days after they are returned). We can submit revisions to stored regulations merely by writing changes on published regulations or by typing only new text.

The system has the capability of scanning text stored in it and indicating a key word or phrase to the operator for revision or verification. This will be of great value if, for example, an Agency component should change its name.

The remaining problem in regulation processing lies in the final processing after ETECS. The backlog in the offset printing and distribution sections of P&PD keeps the

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publication of regulations 2-3 weeks behind schedule. The speed with which ETECS operates is compensating only slightly for delays in processing time.

ETECS still may not be the answer. We may yet come up against unsolvable problems. Advances in technology may cause more changes, and if a new system should be incompatible with ETECS, we'll be back at the beginning. It takes time to work out problems, but we are learning and adapting. The system is working to make life easier for us; and we appreciate ETECS better as time progresses and its advantages become evident.

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# innovation

## THE OC STRATEGIC PLAN

OC

On 10 January 1978 OC published its first formal Strategic Plan. As stated by [REDACTED] the Director of Communications (D-CO), in his introductory statement to the plan, "This document serves a dual purpose. It will guide OC personnel in their planning of Office programs and projects and serve to keep OC customers abreast of Office plans and goals. It will also assist them in the development and submission of communications requirements over the coming years."

The Strategic Plan had its beginning in 1976 with the formation of the OC Planning Staff. This staff acts as an advisor to the D-CO and is tasked with the development of a planning process leading to the identification of long-range objectives and the publication of the Office's Strategic Plan. The staff is comprised of a management level officer, an engineer, and a communications operations officer. To develop a viable plan acceptable to those tasked with implementa-

tion, the staff realized that it must obtain input from all of the Office's operating components. Additionally, the staff believed it was important to involve OC's customers in the long-range planning process to ensure that any new system being designed or developed would meet their future needs. To accomplish this two-fold purpose, the staff hosted a three day OC Planning Symposium in June 1977. Mr. Blake opened the first session in his capacity as Keynote Speaker and answered his own rhetorical question of "Why an OC Planning Staff?" by saying that 1977 is a more complicated world, citing advances in technology, oversight of the Agency, and escalating personnel costs. Mr. Blake addressed a number of issues related to OC's role in support of the Agency and the Intelligence Community and closed with a word of caution that the Planning Staff should restrict itself to planning and avoid the pitfalls of becoming an action group. Other guest speakers included representatives from [REDACTED] DDS&T, E&PDS-DDO, OCR-DDI, OSO-DDS&T and ODP-DDA. In addition to these guest speakers, most of the fifteen symposium participants presented position

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papers on technical options for systems development and philosophical approaches to OC's planning methodology. A record of the proceedings was published at the conclusion of the symposium that constituted the framework of the initial phases of the Strategic Plan.

Armed with the information gleaned from the symposium and additional data derived from inter- and intra-Office discussions, the Staff began to put together an outline approach to the formulation of the document. Problems to be resolved included format of the presentation, the planning cycle, areas of responsibility and goal identification. A number of approaches were tried and the Staff spent a good deal of its preliminary effort "brainstorming" at the blackboard. As a basic design emerged, it was presented to [REDACTED] and the OC Executive Board. Specific changes in certain aspects, coupled with some fine tuning in others, left us with a solid outline for development of the final document. The staff was then able to concentrate on the final writing and editing of the document.

"The Office of Communications Strategic Plan 1978-79" is comprised of four main sections dealing with 1) The Purpose of the Document, 2) The OC Planning Process, 3) The Present State of the Office and 4) The D-CO's Goals. The first section is self-explanatory. The second explains the process by which the D-CO's goals will be turned into a viable set of Office programs. The first step in this process will be the coordinated formulation of annexes to the Strategic Plan by all OC components. Annexes are to address each of the D-CO's stated goals. The third section deals with the present capabilities of OC and includes a thumbnail history of the Office. The fourth section includes overall goals dealing with subjects such as command and control of communications, personnel development, requirements identification and network architecture. Each goal is relatively broad in context but contains sufficient specifics to provide guidance and direction for OC personnel. Now that the document has been published and distributed, the next major step in the process is the development and submission of component annexes. The

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
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annexes are considered to be an integral and extremely important facet of the planning process and the success of the entire Strategic Plan is vitally dependent on the imagination and resourcefulness applied in annex preparation and the determination with which they are executed. Once approved and published, each annex will become a permanent part of the annual Strategic Plan.

OC's mission for the last three decades has literally been to get the message out. Figuratively speaking, we hope that the publication of the OC Strategic Plan will accomplish the same purpose but with a different "message" in mind. Our aim is to make OC personnel aware of our plans for the future. Our secondary goal, but no less important, is to get the message out to our customers. In this regard we are providing wide distribution of the document and encourage feedback from all quarters, since it is only with a complete understanding and awareness of the needs of our customers that we can respond in a positive and satisfactory manner to these needs.

One of the main issues raised by customers at the Planning Symposium was the lack of a designated, published point of contact within OC. This problem was addressed in the Strategic Plan, but in bringing this article to a close, we would like to leave the readers with some numbers to keep handy for contact reference:

Primary Contact on New Operational Requirements:



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## OTR CATALOG OF COURSES

OTR

In November 1977 the OTR published a completely revised Catalog of Courses.

The Catalog is divided into five major sections: General Information, OTR Courses, Component Courses, CIA Self Study Center, and External Training. The OTR courses are listed alphabetically by discipline: Administrative and Clerical, Area Studies, Financial Management, Information Science, Intelligence Analysis and Communications Skills, Language, Management, On-Request Courses, Operations, and Orientation and General. The Component Courses section contains offerings of the four Directorates. The External Training section is divided into seven subsections: Agency Off-Campus Program, Correspondence, Government, Language, Management, Nongovernment, and Training Selection Board.

An index has been included for reader assistance.



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In order to maintain its continuing usefulness, the Catalog will be updated quarterly. The first quarterly revision—the OTR Courses section—is now being printed.

Questions on the Catalog may be referred to [REDACTED] Training Support Division, extension [REDACTED]

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#### THE OC CENTER FOR FAMILY INFORMATION

[REDACTED] OC

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(U) The change in women's roles has been a slow but steady ascent toward individuality and self. Wives see themselves much less frequently as an appendage of their husbands and more as an equally important corporate member of the family.

(U) OC has for several months been investigating ways of improving the mechanisms for, and quality of, the interface with families of its employees. After initial research, including interviews with OC wives, a workshop was held in August 1977 with six wives of OC employees to investigate further the effects of stress and geographic relocation on families. One of the major recommendations of the workshop was to establish a "Center for Family Information." As a result of this recommendation, the Center is now being established.

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(U) Some of the initial services intended for it are:

- Collecting supplemental post information, written by wives at the post, from a family perspective.
- Collecting and distributing family information about overseas posts by:

Interviewing families recently returned from overseas, sending out questionnaires to families prior to departure from post or while on home leave, or by conducting telephone interviews with families while on home leave.

Providing access to families just before departing for overseas and maintaining a telephone "hotline" as an access point for spouses who are on home leave between assignments and will not be traveling to Washington with the employee.

- Acting as a referent to other administrative services available in the organization.
- Providing information on relative language skill needs and language training availability.
- Maintaining information on opportunities to market skills and talents in a given area and correspondingly maintaining an index of skills and talents of spouses.
- Providing comparative economic information for families returning to the U.S.

The Center will be located adjacent to the OC lounge on the third floor of the [REDACTED] Building and will be staffed by an OC wife, who is in the final stages of processing for employment. An exception was granted by the DDA to the anti-nepotism policy for her

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25X1A to become OC's first "Family Information Coordinator." Her duties will include coordinating the efforts described above as well as participating in the Student Wives Overseas Orientation Program (SWOOP). This program is held at [REDACTED] for new OC personnel and their wives prior to their first overseas tour. We believe the formation of the Center for Family Information will prove a major step in easing much of the uncertainty and concern associated with families traveling abroad.

(ADMINISTRATIVE—INTERNAL USE ONLY)

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